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Wireless networking increases the flexibility in the home, work place and community to connect to the 
Internet without being tied to a single location. Wireless networking has rapidly increased in popularity 
over recent years.  There has also been a change in the use of the internet by users.  Home users have 
embraced wireless technology and businesses see it as having a great impact on their operational 
efficiency.  Both home users and industry are sending increasingly sensitive information through these 
wireless networks as online delivery of banking, commercial and governmental services becomes more 
widespread.  However undeniable the benefits of wireless networking are, there are additional risks that 
do not exist in wired networks.  It is imperative that adequate assessment and management of risk is 
undertaken by businesses and home users.  This paper reviews wireless network protocols, investigates 
issues of reliability, availability and security when using wireless networks. The paper, by use of a case 
study, illustrates the issues and importance of implementing secured wireless networks, and shows the 
significance of the issue.  The paper presents a discussion of the case study and a set of 
recommendations to mitigate the threat. 
Povzetek: Zanesljivost, varnost in dosegljivost brezžičnih omrežij. 
 
1 Introduction 
The use of the Internet is increasing by home users has 
been continually increasing for some time, and this 
increase can also be seen in the context of businesses, 
banking and governmental services.  According to the 
Office for National Statistics, more that half of the 
households in the UK had some form of Internet 
connection in 2005.  The number of households that have 
an Internet connection is a statistic that has steadily risen 
from just over 30% of households in 2000, to 54% of 
households in 2005 [Office for National Statistics 2007]. 
In an article in New Scientist in 2005, Graham-Rowe 
predicted the growth of broadband Internet connection 
and wireless networks in the home up until the year 
2009.  It was predicted that in 2006 the percentage of 
households in Western Europe with both a broadband 
connection and wireless network would be 
approximately 12% [Graham-Rowe 2005]. As the 
number of households that utilise an Internet connection, 
so too does the range of services that are accessed. 
In recent years, industry has recognised the benefits 
in teleworking.  Companies are no longer concerned that 
those working away from the office are simply not 
working.  Indeed, if anything, those working away from 
the office now tend to work too much.  In 2004 in all US 
government departments, there 751, 844 employees 
deemed to be eligible for teleworking out of 1, 749, 998, 
a total of 43% of the workforce.  Of those eligible for 
teleworking, 102, 291 undertook the activity at least 
some of the time, 14% of those eligible or 6% of the total 
workforce..  In the UK similar statistics were witnessed 
in 2001.  In the spring of 2001, 2.2 million people in the 
UK, representing 7.4 per cent of the total labour force, 
worked from home at least one day a week using both a 
telephone and a computer to undertake their duties.  This 
had represented a dramatic growth over previous years.  
The total number of teleworkers in the UK in 2001 had 
increased by nearly 70 per cent over the period 1997 to 
2001 [Office for National Statistics 2002]. According to 
the Sunday Times the percentage of staff working one 
morning or afternoon a week at home has more than 
doubled in the past two years.  The newspaper reports 
that according to research for The Sunday Times 100 
Best Companies to Work For 2007 List, the figure has 
risen from 14.1% to 31.7% [Thomas 2007].   
The nature of how teleworkers operate has also 
changed.  In 2001, 71% of teleworkers operated in 
different places using home as a base.  This percentage 
had increased to 75% of all teleworkers operating in 
different places using home as a base.  The increase in 
the number of teleworkers operating in a different place 
using home as a base had increased from 1.05 million in 
2001 to 1.77 million in 2005, an increase of 60% [Office 
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for National Statistics 2005].  This increase in the 
mobility of teleworkers presents a significant increase in 
risk of security compromises. 
 
















2001 673 1, 916 2, 590 433 1, 051 1, 484 
2002 698 2, 062 2, 760 484 1, 381 1, 185 
2003 707 2, 207 2, 915 516 1, 553 2, 069 
2004 761 2, 243 3, 004 562 1, 599 2, 161 
2005 768 2, 324 3, 092 603 1, 774 2, 377 
 
An increase in the number of employees’ teleworking 
represents a risk that can undermine security in business.  
However, there are other trends that point to an increase 
in risk to the public in general as well as businesses. In 
the UK a high percentage of adult users use e-
government services to retrieve information; however, 
the actual level of interaction with the service is low, 
especially compared to Europe [Eurostat Online 
European Statistics 2006].  With traditional 
governmental services, a citizen usually visits a 
government office and is authenticated by presenting 
papers. Identification to an official is replaced with a 
digital service where credentials are electronic and 
identity theft can become an increasing problem. 
Security of the citizen’s connection is an important part 
of ensuring a secure e-government service. Where the 
services are provided to the citizens of a country the term 
c2g (Citizen to Government) is used in much the same 
way as b2c and b2b are used for business to consumer 
and business to business, respectively.  The UK 
government has defined c2g as the online relationship 
between its citizens and various government departments 
they communicate with. 
In Europe the eEurope 2005 Action Plan sets 7 
targets for e-services. These are: 
• Interactive public services: Member States 
should have ensured that basic public services are 
interactive, where relevant, and accessible for all.  The 
Commission and Member States must agree on a list of 
public services for which interactivity and 
interoperability are desirable.  Relevant issues include 
exploiting the potential of broadband networks and 
multi-platform access, and addressing access for people 
with special needs;  
• Public procurement: Member States should 
carry out a significant part of public procurement 
electronically, cutting costs and raising efficiency in 
government procurement.  The European Parliament and 
Council should adopt as quickly as possible the 
legislative package on procurement;  
• Public Internet Access Points (PIAP's): All 
citizens should have easy access to PIAP's, preferably 
with broadband connections, in their communes or 
municipalities,  In establishing PIAP's, Member States 
should use structural funds and work in collaboration 
with the private and/or voluntary sector, where 
necessary;  
• Broadband connections:  Member States should 
aim to have had broadband connections for all public 
administrations by 2005.  Authorities should not 
discriminate between technologies when purchasing 
connections;  
• Interoperability: The Commission presented a 
staff working paper on the importance of interoperability 
for e-Government services at the 2003 e-Government 
Ministerial Conference and intends to proposed a 
European interoperability framework for pan-European 
e-Government services that provides a series of 
recommendations and defines generic standards with 
regard to organizational, semantic and technical aspects 
of interoperability, offering a comprehensive set of 
principles for European co-operation in e-government;  
• Culture and Tourism: The Commission, in co-
operation with Member States, the private sector and 
regional authorities, will defined and launch e-services to 
promote Europe and to offer user-friendly public 
information.  Building on the Communication "Working 
together for the future of European tourism", the 
Commission is now developing a European Tourism 
Portal.  This work is being undertaken through an ETD 
project that involves a collaboration between EC3, 
LiXto, ITC-irst, Siemens Austria and Tiscover and is 
currently in the second stage of development;  
• Secure communications between public 
services: The Commission and Member States have 
proposed to examine the possibilities to establish a 
secure communications environment for the exchange of 
classified government information.  
The EU has agreed a list of 20 basic services that 
should be available as part of e-government. These 
consist of 12 relating to citizens and a further 8 services 




It is also these 20 services that have been used by the 
EU and researchers for benchmarking the performance of 
e-government accessibility. 
For e-government to be a success with the citizens, 
they must be able to connect to the government 
infrastructure in a dependable manner where there is 
Citizen services Business Services 
Job search Social contribution for 
employees 
Income taxes Corporate tax 
Social security benefits VAT 
Personal documents Registration of a new 
company 
Car registration Submission of data to the 
statistical office 
Application for building 
permission 
Custom declaration 
Declaration to the police Environment-related 
permits 
Public libraries Public procurement 
Birth and marriage 
certificates 
 






Health-related services  
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reliability, availability and security of connection. A 
government has great control of the infrastructure 
connecting its offices and departments together but not 
the connection to business and in particular its citizens 
rely on external third parties. Additionally, some of the 
responsibility for the dependability will rely on the 
citizen’s ability to set-up a connection which implies a 
level of knowledge that is likely that the citizen does not 
have [Furnell 2005]. 
An important aspect of the e-government is how its 
citizens access the systems and the infrastructure extends 
beyond the government offices and officials to wherever 
the citizens access the services within the community. 
In a household where the Internet connection is either 
direct to the PC or a wired network, anybody trying to 
access the network will have to come through the 
modem/termination unit and if it has been configured 
correctly there should be a firewall and/or NAT set-up.  
In a wireless networked environment, the security of the 
network is not as controlled. 
2 WLAN security 
Wireless networking has experienced a huge increase 
in popularity over the last couple of years. The necessary 
hardware is widely available to consumers, it is 
affordable, and relatively easy to install and configure. 
Gateway devices, such as "routers" or "firewalls", that 
allow users to share a broadband connection with and 
protect multiple computers on a home network have been 
utilised for some time and have increased in popularity as 
more users in the home see the need for the use of an 
Internet connection and access to the same peripherals, 
such as printers.  The addition of wireless capabilities to 
these gateway devices gives the user the convenience of 
taking a computer anywhere in the house without 
running wires through floors and attics. 
2.1 Operation of 802.11 networks 
Wireless communication under 802.11 [802.11 Working 
Group 2006] comes in two flavours: the Independent 
Basic Service Set (IBSS) or ad-hoc mode, and the Basic 
Service Set (BSS) Infrastructure mode. The IBSS mode 
allows wireless clients to talk directly to each other 
without a central controlling mechanism.  To join such a 
network all that is needed is the Service Set Identifier 
(SSID) and the channel it operates on. This mode is 
generally considered to be insecure. Although it supports 
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), it is not supported by 
WiFi Protected Access (WPA); however under 802.11i 
and the introduction of WPA2 ad-hoc networks will 
support better encryption. It is these ad-hoc wireless 
networks form the basis of mesh wireless networks being 
implemented by cities across the world. The Cloud, a 
wireless broadband service provider, has announced the 
creation of meshes in 9 cites across the UK. The BSS 
mode uses a controlling mechanism, normally by an 
access point to control the communication. The BSS 
functions in a manner similar to a switched wired 
network while the IBSS operates in a manner comparable 
to a hub based wired network. In BSS mode all traffic is 
routed through the access points (AP) even between peer 
wireless devices. There is an extension to the BSS where 
multiple BSS can be connected via a wired network 
connecting the access points known as the Extended 
Service Set (ESS). 
An SSID is the name of a wireless local area network 
(WLAN). All wireless devices on a WLAN must employ 
the same SSID in order to communicate with each other. 
The SSID on wireless clients can be set either manually, 
by entering the SSID into the client network settings, or 
automatically, by leaving the SSID unspecified or blank. 
SSIDs are case sensitive text strings containing a 
sequence of alphanumeric characters with a maximum 
length of 32 characters. All access points come with a 
default SSID set, some of the more common ones are: 
 
Manufacturer Default SSID 
Cisco tsunami 
3Com 101 
Lucent/Cabletron RoamAbout Default 
Network Name 







Wireless networks work in two modes: the standard 
default 802.11 mode of broadcasting their SSID and a 
mode in which the SSID is not broadcast.  The former is 
known as an open system and the latter is a modified 
closed system which is a propriety addition to the 
standard. 
An open system will broadcast management beacon 
frames at a fixed interval that contain capability 
information of the access point.  This is intended to 
enable wireless clients to detect the closest access point 
and if there is a stronger signal with the same SSID, it re-
associates with the signal allowing roaming between 
access points. 
A closed system does not broadcast the SSID as part 
of the beacon management frame and a client must have 
prior knowledge of the SSID to enable it to join a closed 
system using a probe request. However, some access 
points will respond to probe requests that contain a blank 
SSID or contain an SSID set to “any”. This behaviour is 
modifiable on some access points, typically enterprise 
class equipment. 
The Microsoft Windows XP SP 1-based Wireless 
Zero Configuration service suffers from what Microsoft 
calls "behaviour by design." If the wireless network is set 
to so that it does not broadcast its SSID, Microsoft's 
wireless manager periodically drops its non-broadcasting 
WiFi connection in response to the presence of a 
broadcasting SSID-based network. 
2.2 Detecting wireless networks 
There are two basic techniques for locating wireless 
access points: passive or active searching based on 
802.11.  Both approaches are easy to implement and only 
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need the most basic equipment and set-up. Each if these 
techniques employs a process known as “sniffing”, 
where the wireless card listens for management packets.  
There is a great deal of commercial and open source 
software that can do this and will also record the details 
of the packets; the wireless client on a device does this as 
part of its normal function.  Sniffing software takes this 
functionality and applies additional techniques to allow 
listening to take place on all possible channels; by 
switching the channel the card is working on at a regular 
interval. 
Additionally, certain wireless card chipsets are more 
flexible and are more suitable for use with sniffing 
software. The best cards are ones that can be placed into 
what is called the Monitor mode, also known as RFMON 
mode, which is similar to promiscuous mode on wired 
network interface cards. It allows the wireless card to 
sniff all the traffic that the card receives instead of 
sniffing all the traffic from the associated network. 
Usually, the card is unable to transmit or otherwise be 
used when in this mode. It is also used for passive 
stumbling, a technique used in wardriving where the 
wireless card listens for base stations instead of actively 
probing them to determine their presence. 
Passive searching is to purely listen for the 
transmitted management beacon frames. It only needs to 
be within receiver range to detect a network; no traffic is 
generated by passive sniffing.  Passive sniffers are also 
capable of recording data packets for additional 
dissection. However, they require a card and driver 
capable of radio frequency (RF) Monitor support, which 
enables raw packet detection. They cannot detect a non-
beaconing network with no data traffic, though it is 
possible to record packets for analysis for encryption 
breaking and MAC address searching. 
Active searching uses the probe response/request 
feature where a probe request sent from the client to the 
access point for information results in the probe response 
frame if the access point is so configured. Inexpensive 
wireless access points intended for home use do not 
normally allow the user to disable the beaconing 
mechanism; this level of configuration is normally found 
on enterprise class equipment. This method does not 
need traffic to be transmitted across the network for a 
network to be found; however, it does generate packet 
traffic that can be detected by intrusion detection 
systems. This form of active scanning using probe 
requests is not completely effective at finding all wireless 
access points. 
An alternative active method of scanning to detect 
networks, where both SSID broadcast and probe 
response are only actuated by a probe request with a 
valid SSID, is to passively listen for a communication 
session between the access point and client and then 
issue a disassociation request. This causes the client to 
break the communication link and after a short period of 
time, it issues a probe request and re-associates with the 
access point allowing the management frames to be 
captured and the SSID to be identified. 
Typically, the minimum wardriving kit consists of a 
laptop, wireless network card and sniffing software 
though many use a Global Positioning System (GPS) unit 
to provide geographical location information. Additional 
mapping utilities are needed to generate maps of 
locations of detected wireless networks if the positional 
data is recorded. GPS is an American system of 24 
orbiting satellites that can provide a positional fix to a 
resolution of a metre though most commercial equipment 
is less accurate than this. 
2.3 Wireless security measures 
The main insecurity with wireless networks compared to 
wired networks is the easy of accessing the transmission 
medium used, i.e. with a wired network to sniff packets, 
there has to be a physical access to the network whilst 
with wireless networks, the transmission is easily 
available outside the physical building. Insecurities on 
wireless networks other than those caused by the ease of 
accessing the transmission media are the same as for a 
wired network, i.e. packets can be sniffed if sent in clear 
text across wires if someone has packet sniffing software 
on the same segment of the network as the packet is 
being transmitted across. 
In order to establish some form of protection for 
wireless networks, the WEP algorithm, has been 
developed as part of the 802.11 standard. It restricts 
access to the network to those who has the same key and 
is supposed to give the equivalent privacy as those on a 
wired network. However, a number of flaws have been 
discovered in the WEP algorithm [Fluhrer, et al 2001, 
Mead and McGraw 2003], which seriously undermine 
the security of the system and leaves the system open to a 
number of attacks: 
• Passive attacks to decrypt traffic based on 
statistical analysis. 
• Active attack to inject new traffic from 
unauthorised mobile stations, based on known 
plaintext. 
• Active attacks to decrypt traffic, based on 
tricking the access point. 
• Dictionary-building attack that, after analysis of 
about a day's worth of traffic, allows real-time 
automated decryption of all traffic. 
It is practical to mount these attacks using only 
inexpensive off-the-shelf equipment. It is recommend 
that anyone using an 802.11 wireless network does not 
rely on WEP for security, but rather employ other 
security measures to protect the wireless network. The 
effectiveness of the attacks applies to both the 40-bit and 
the so-called 128-bit versions of WEP equally well. 
The 802.11 standard uses Ethernet packets across 
wireless networks, Ethernet use a Media Access Control 
(MAC) address which is a hardware address that 
uniquely identifies each node of a network and is 
configured as part of network interface card (NIC) and 
regulated by the IEEE.  This allows a further method of 
securing a network by the use of MAC filters, which 
restricts access to an AP to authorised MAC addresses 
only. Most APs provide this capability for checking the 
MAC address of the station before allowing it to connect 
to the network, thus providing an additional control 
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layer. However this approach requires that the list of 
MAC addresses be configured and maintained.  This can 
be circumvented since MAC addresses are transmitted as 
part of the Ethernet frames and can be read from captured 
packets. It is , however, possible to spoof the MAC 
address of node using various software such as SMAC, a 
MAC address modifying utility for Windows operating 
systems, regardless of whether the manufactures allow 
this option or not. This allows an intruder to alter the 
MAC address of the node to match a known node on the 
network. 
Further security is available using WiFi Protected 
Access (WPA and WPA2) which was created in response 
to the serious weaknesses in WEP. WPA implements the 
majority of the IEEE 802.11i standard, and is intended as 
an intermediate measure to take the place of WEP while 
802.11i is prepared.  It is designed to work with all 
wireless network interface cards, but not necessarily with 
first generation wireless access points. WPA2 
implements the full standard, but does not work with 
some older network cards. There are two modes of 
operation for WPA: 
• Personal mode or Pre-Shared Key (PSK) mode 
is designed for home and small office networks 
that cannot afford the cost and complexity of an 
802.1X authentication server. Each user must 
enter a passphrase to access the network. The 
passphrase may be from eight to 63 ASCII 
characters or 64 hexadecimal digits (256 bits). 
The passphrase may be stored on the user's 
computer at their discretion under most 
operating systems to avoid re-entry. The 
passphrase must remain stored in the WiFi 
access point. 
• Enterprise mode is designed for larger offices 
and enterprises various Extensible 
Authentication Protocol (EAP) types are now 
supported in enhanced WPA/WPA2 compared 
to just the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol 
(TKIP) in the original WPA and EAP-TLS in 
WPA2 
Additional security can be obtained by deploying 
standard TCP/IP security protocols over the connections, 
such as IPSec and the use of Virtual Private Network 
(VPN). 
2.4 Legal issues 
The legality or rather the illegality of accessing a 
wireless networks is not in question; under most legal 
systems accessing a computer system without permission 
is illegal. However, the activity of wardriving is more of 
a grey area as often the legality is dependent on local 
laws.Law enforcement officials, increasingly concerned 
about wireless networks, say the possibilities for 
mischief run the gamut. A wireless hacker's intentions 
could be as malevolent as identity theft or as benign as 
using a neighbour’s Internet connection to check e-mail 
or scan the newspaper online. Sometimes they drain 
other people's bandwidth to illegally download movies 
and other copyrighted material or access pornography. 
Others are pranksters, who maliciously lock people out 
of their wireless networks just for fun, others still are 
those that are spammers, using unauthorised Internet 
access to send masses of unsolicited e-mail. 
In the UK, it should be said that listening to 
broadcasts in the Industrial, Science and Medical  (ISM) 
band is not illegal as this is a license exempt band, 
indeed the 802.11 standard is written so that wireless 
networks broadcast their presence and hence only the 
built-in mechanism of the transport system is used. This 
effectively allows passive scanning to take place, and 
since active scanning uses the mechanisms built into the 
standard to identify a network.  Though a slight increase 
in electrical power usage may be witnessed or a very 
slight delay in a transmission of a packet may be caused, 
this is not considered to be illegal as it is part of the client 
functionality to identify and attach to a network with a 
hidden SSID.  Whilst this is the case, there may be moral 
and ethical considerations of what is done with the 
information gathered from active scanning. Any activity 
resulting in an association with an access point, even 
accidentally, could be considered illegal - accessing 
information or sending data across the network without 
the permission of the network administrators would be 
consider illegal in many places around the world. 
If a disassociation packet is issued, causing a client to 
lose contact with the network and reconnect to the 
network to generate extra traffic this would result in a 
degradation in performance of the network and this may 
be deemed illegal in some countries. 
An interesting consideration is whether it should be 
illegal if, by using passive means, enough information is 
collected to decode the WEP key and no further use of 
the key made.  No connection is made to the network, its 
performance is unaffected and the information is 
transmitted publicly and any information broadcast on 
the ISM can be listened to. However, information vital 
for the security of the network has been gained leading to 
a potential compromise. 
2.5 Availability and reliability 
Interference to wireless networks can come from a 
number of sources, the 802.11 standard uses the 2.4GHz 
and the 5GHz bands which are generally unlicensed or 
license exempt around the world. The 2.4GHz band 
which is part of the ISM band is crowded with a large 
number of devices ranging from wireless baby monitors, 
microwave ovens to cordless phones. Wireless networks 
working in this band have to contend with all these 
devices, plus other wireless access points in the same 
area. 
Although the 2.4GHz band is divided into 14 
channels (not all are available around the world), the 
bandwidth of each channel is sufficient that adjacent or 
near adjacent channels interfere with each other. Of the 
11 channels commonly used in the USA or the 13 
channels used in the majority of Europe, a maximum of 
three channels are spread enough apart to avoid 
interference problems. 
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One of the problems in hiding or disabling the SSID 
is that it becomes harder for those configuring wireless 
networks to identify nearby networks operating on the 
same or adjacent channels. 
Additionally most emerging radio technologies for 
Wireless Personal Area Networks, such as the Bluetooth 
protocol, are designed also to operate in the 2.4GHz ISM 
band. Since both Bluetooth and IEEE 802.11 devices use 
the same frequency band and are likely to come together 
in a laptop or may be close together at a desktop, 
interferences may lead to significant performance 
degradation. 
802.11 is a Collision Sense Multiple Access Protocol 
where each wireless point checks for another wireless 
point transmitting: if it detects a transmission it will wait 
for a random length time delay and try again; if two 
transmit at the same time, both detect a collision and wait 
for a random time delay and try again. The more points 
on the same channel within the range, the more 
likelihood of a collision exists and increased collision 
results in reduced data transmission rates. However, the 
14 usable channels allocated worldwide allow wireless 
networks in close proximity to each other to use different 
channels. The drawback is that the channels are separated 
by 5MHz; each channel has a bandwidth of 22MHz 
causing it to interfere with adjacent channels which 
actually means that in the 11 or 13 channel 
implementation, it is only possible to utilise three 
channels concurrently without any overlap in frequency, 
typically taken as channels 1, 6 and 11. 
2.6 Security risks 
With a wired network, the only possible access for an 
intruder would be through the broadband connection and 
normally through a firewall in the case of a broadband 
modem. With Network Address Translation (NAT) and 
security software on the individual computers, there is a 
fairly comprehensive layered defence system whose 
effectiveness would depend on the ability of the installer 
or the default settings. 
A wireless network allows access from outside the 
property onto the network behind the broadband modem 
with its firewall and NAT. This means instead of 
intruders needing to get through the broadband 
connection, the network has to deal with intruders 
connected directly to the network.  Since the wireless 
router is designed to provide a wireless Internet 
connection and its range can reach as far as 150 feet it 
can often reach many public roads and nearby homes. An 
attacker could be outside a home or business with a 
laptop with a WiFi card and the right software, gain 
access to private information on the network. 
Instead of gaining access the public side of the 
gateway device, the intruder connects directly to the 
network on the private side of the gateway device, 
completely bypassing any hardware firewall between the 
private network and the broadband modem. Many people 
assume that since they are behind a firewall their private 
network is safe, letting down their guard, sharing drives, 
and generally being less careful about security. The 
intruder can take advantage of this by perusing devices 
and gaining access to confidential data such as personal 
information (financial data, tax records and wills) and 
work-related information such as confidential 
specifications and trade secrets that the victim brings 
home from the office. By employing a sniffer an intruder 
can also sniff email or FTP user names and passwords 
since they are usually transmitted in clear text. This 
allows  unauthorised access to email accounts or web 
servers without the victim's knowledge. 
Another risk posed by lack of security is identity 
theft.  Whilst there has been no direct conviction for this 
there is certainly a great deal evidence that it occurs.  By 
using information such as tax returns and resumes 
obtained by compromising a home network, it is possible 
to use the name, address, date of birth and National 
Insurance number to create a bogus identity. The 
increasing use of on-line services for banking and 
government makes it more tempting to use alternative 
identities or to gather information on an individual to 
impersonate them. A poll by Winmark Research, on 
behalf of RSA Security, found that two-thirds of 
consumers used the same password to access different 
types of websites - from email to bank accounts [Leyden 
2004]. One third even admitted to sharing passwords 
with friends and family, massively increasing the risk of 
fraud. In the survey, the most common password 
categories were family names such as partners or 
children (15%), followed by football teams (11%) and 
pets (8%), the most common password being "admin". 
Many workers who regularly had to change their 
passwords kept them on a piece of paper in their desk 
drawers, or stored them with a Word document. With the 
ability to search people’s computers via a wireless attack, 
it makes it easier for identity theft to occur. Secured 
networks could be jeopardised as a result of human 
vulnerabilities such as lack of awareness and adherence 
to usage policies [Bhagyavati, et al 2004]. 
3 Case study of luton 
During Dec 2005 and Jan 2006, an extensive wardrive 
around Luton was undertaken as part of a research 
project into the extent of security in wireless networks in 
the community. The wardrive was conducted by one of 
the authors using equipment only capable of detecting 
802.11b and g networks and works only in the 2.4GHz 
band range. It uses active scanning and only detects 
networks that respond to a general probe request.  The 
analysis looked at number of secure and unsecured 
networks, distribution of channels and percentage of the 
population of Luton and combined it with data from the 
last national census conducted in 2001 and statistics from 
the National Statistics Office on number of households 
with Internet and Broadband access. The wardriving 
survey of Luton shows similarities with those conducted 
in London and Bristol in the UK and in Frankfurt and 
Paris in Europe [Jaques 2005]. 
Luton is a typical town in the UK within the southeast 
of the country about 30 miles north of London on the M1 
with good communication links. It has a population of 
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187000 living in 70775 households (Data obtained from 
the 2001 Census results), covering an area of 436 
hectares and used to be a major automotive 
manufacturing town in the 60’s and 70’s. Looking at the 
national average of 55% households having Internet 
access, about 38900 households in the town would have 
Internet access; however in the southeast, the percentage 
of households with Internet access raises to 64% and if 
Luton was typical of towns in this region, the estimate 
would be 45300 households. 
Tentative results from the wardriving survey shows 
that for the whole of Luton, it is expected that there are 
around 4000 wireless networks with 50% of these being 
unsecured. These results are only for the 2.4Ghz band 
and 802.11b and g wireless networks. This means that 
there may be networks that have not been detected and 
the number of networks would then be higher. 
There are 24,479,439 households in the UK, of which 
it is estimated that around 13,463,700 have Internet 
access.  It is also thought that 10% of these have a 
wireless network, meaning an estimated 1,346,370 
wireless networks.  If the figure of 50% of all wireless 
networks being insecure holds throughout the country, it 
would mean that there were approximately 673,185 
unsecured wireless networks in the UK. Confirmation of 
the order of magnitude of wireless networks can be seen 
in a report by Contractor UK [Contractor UK 2005] 
quoting research by IDC who estimated there were 
958,000 wireless networks in the UK, with this figure 
expected to double to almost two million by the end of 
the year. 
A further characteristics examined in the case study 
was the channel usage of the detected networks.  As 
expected, channels 1, 6 and 11 were the most commonly 
used channels with channel 11 being used by 52% of the 
detected networks. The actual distribution of the 
channels has not been fully analysed but it can be 
expected that in some areas the wireless networks are not 
running at the best possible bandwidth expected from 
ideal conditions due to the devices suffering from 
collisions generated by nearby networks. The average 
user, however, will be unaware that such collisions may 
be taking place and may well apportion blame elsewhere 
A further characteristics examined in the case study 
was the ratio of ad-hoc to infrastructure and the usage of 
SSID’s.  In the survey, 2% of the detected networks were 
in IBSS or ad-hoc mode, and the majority detected were 
infrastructure mode. In a sample of 2363 networks, there 
were 1077 distinct SSID’s; however, the majority of the 
SSID’s found were the original default settings of the 
equipment. 
4 Recommendations 
There are a great deal of sources available that provide 
information regarding the construction of secure wireless 
networks.  These sources can be found easily and can be 
implemented with tittle difficulty for those with some 
technical knowledge and confidence. However, most of 
those installing a wireless network do not have technical 
knowledge nor confidence and may fail to understand the 
problems associated with wireless networks. 
We recommend that to improve the availability and 
reliability of a wireless network, a person configuring the 
network should conduct a small site survey using widely 
available free of charge software.  The results of this 
survey can then inform the choice of location and 
channel.  Due to the large increase in use of wireless 
networks, one should also check regularly to examine if 
the conditions around the location have changed and 
adjust settings accordingly. This may well be beyond the 
ability of most of the general public and additionally they 
may not have the tools to conduct the survey.  In such 
cases this could be a service that is sourced and should be 
of low cost. It is also possible using most wireless client 
software, to display a list of available networks but this 
will not normally show those with hidden SSIDs.  
However, as a minimum it is possible to use the client 
software to detect wireless networks and the channel they 
are working over and then setting the channel of the 
access point to one that will have the least interference. 
There are a great deal of information sources that 
recommend users stop or to disable the SSID broadcast; 
we strongly recommend against this action.  The 
disabling of an SSID broadcast offers very little increase 
in security to anyone attempting to access a network, it 
only stops beacon broadcast on the access point. 
Essentially, disabling SSID broadcast just stops the 
inclusion of SSID’s in the broadcast beacon frame which 
is the one of the five SSID broadcast mechanisms.  Using 
Microsoft Windows XP SP 1-based Wireless Zero 
Configuration service to manage the wireless network 
card suffers from what Microsoft calls "behaviour by 
design." If the wireless network is not set to broadcast the 
SSID, Microsoft's wireless manager periodically drops 
the non-broadcasting WiFi connection in response to the 
presence of a broadcasting SSID-based network.  Thus, 
in practice, it does not improve security to stop the SSID 
broadcast and doing so can cause problems with wireless 
networks.  The inclusion of the SSID in the standard was 
to aid management of wireless networks and it really 
should be used for doing this. Allowing users of wireless 
networks to identify channels being used and select other 
channels can reduce interference.  Whilst those with 
advanced knowledge can examine networks in the 
vicinity, the average user will not be able to examine 
those that withhold the SSID and so collisions may be 
rife.  This can be seen in the case study in which 52% of 
networks were operating on the same channel. 
A recommended approach to wireless security would 
be to use a layered approach with MAC filtering and 
WPA or WPA2 at the access point. The use of IPSec and 
VPNs on the network and ensuring the machines on the 
network are protected. Ultimately, it may be the best to 
follow the practice to put publicly accessible servers into 
a Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) and put the wireless access 
point into a firewalled section of the network with rules 
governing communications to the rest of the network; 
however until equipment for the home can support this, it 
will remain a security weakness. 
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In general it is recommended to apply extra caution to 
wireless connections in a public area as they may not 
provide as much security as wired Internet connections. 
In fact, many "hotspots" - wireless networks in public 
areas like airports, hotels and restaurants - reduce their 
security. Unless a security token is used, it may be 
decided that accessing an online bank account through a 
wireless connection is not worth the security risk of a 
snooper capturing your packets and decoding them. 
One of the most important recommendations would 
be to the manufacturers of wireless networking 
equipment to provide information in an easy to 
understand format on setting up wireless network and 
possible for governments to put pressure on the 
manufactures to do so. A better informed public will 
result in better set-up wireless networks and hence better 
availability, reliability and security of them.  
5 Conclusions 
In this paper we have discussed some of the key 
concerns surrounding the security of wireless networks. 
We have highlighted a number of weaknesses in existing 
protocols and configurations of wireless networks 
including how these weaknesses can be exploited.  The 
paper has also considered some of the legality aspects of 
accessing information regarding the configuration of a 
wireless network as well as the accessing of transmitted 
or stored information on the network. 
A case study has been presented that demonstrates the 
extent of the problem and this study is to be used as a 
basis for further work.  Additional equipment will be 
used later in the study to detect 802.11,b and g across 
both the 2.4GHz and 5GHz bands The research 
investigates wireless networks within the community and 
looks at aspects of reliability, security and whether 
education or training would help reduce potentially 
insecure networks and improve the reliability and 
availability of them. The wardrive identifies the number 
of wireless networks and their distribution around the 
town.  
We have presented a number of recommendations 
that can ensure the greater security of wireless networks.  
These recommendations require action from both 
manufacturers and those configuring a wireless network, 
most often the end user of the equipment. 
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